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Abstract
This  paper  studies  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  and  international  trade  on  household 
income inequality and poverty using detailed micro-data across Brazilian states, from 1987 to 
2005. Results suggest that Brazilian states that were more exposed to tariff cuts experienced 
smaller reductions in household poverty and inequality. If significance of results on Brazilian 
states  depends  on  the  choice  of  poverty  and  inequality  indicators,  robust  and  contrasting 
results  emerge  when  we  disaggregate  into  rural  and  urban  areas  within  states.  Trade 
liberalization contributes to poverty and inequality increases in urban areas and may be linked 
to inequality declines in rural areas (no significant effect on rural poverty appears from our 
study). In terms of observed integration to world markets, import penetration plays a similar 
role  as  trade  liberalization  for  Brazilian  states  as  a  whole.  On  the  contrary,  rising  export 
exposure appears to have significantly reduced both measures of household welfare.
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1. Introduction.
The effects of globalization on income distribution continue to be one of the most discussed
topics  in  academic  and  policy  circles. Back  in  the  eighties,  the  policy  debate  essentially 
involved  industrialized  countries  seized  by  rising  inequalities  and  increased  international 
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competition in domestic markets. Since then, the implementation of trade reforms in several 
developing and emerging countries and the growing availability of datasets has led to more 
studies on the distributional and social effects of international trade in countries from the 
developing  world.  The  debate  is  partially  motivated  by  the  complexity  of  the  channels 
through which globalization - an all-purpose term here used to describe trade liberalization 
and integration to world markets - affects inequality as well as poverty within a country (see 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2007; Winters et alii, 2004; Ferreira et alii., 2007a, for a survey 
on the various trade-transmission mechanisms). 
In this paper we study the impact of trade liberalization and international trade on household 
income inequality and poverty using detailed micro-data across Brazilian states, from 1987 to 
2005. We seek to measure whether, within Brazil, states that experienced a greater degree of 
exposure to trade during the past two decades exhibited differential changes in their income 
distribution, both in poverty and inequality levels. 
This  paper  makes  several  contributions  to  the  literature  on  globalization  and  income 
distribution. First of all, using sub-national units of observation (in our case, the Brazilian 
states, together with a distinction between rural and urban areas within states),  this study 
performs an analysis taking into account regional differences in the Brazilian economy. By 
taking this regional approach, our paper puts up to a recent strand of research that includes the 
spatial dimension in the study of the impact of  trade liberalization on income distribution 
within a country (see Wei and Wu, 2002, on China; Topalova, 2005, on India; McCaig, 2009, 
on Vietnam; Nicita, 2004 on Mexico).
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Second, the distributional measures considered in this paper are broader than those usually 
looked at in the literature. Though ultimately trade reforms should affect household welfare, it 
is only recently that a few studies have considered measures beyond wage inequality and skill 
premium (Topalova, 2005; Porto, 2003, 2006; Ferreira et alii., 2007a; McCaig, 2009). The 
focus of the literature on skill premium is not surprising and essentially derives from the 
predictions  of  the  classical  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  (HOS)  model.  According  to  the  
HOS model, in poor countries, usually considered as relatively well endowed in unskilled 
1 Another branch of the literature, recently developed, studies whether incomes or wages are higher in regions 
with access to larger markets for their goods, using new economic geography models (see for example, Hanson, 
2005; Redding and Venables, 2004; Fally et alii., 2008).3
labor, trade liberalization should raise relative demand for this factor and consequently, lower 
wage  inequality  and  eventually  reduce  poverty.  These  predictions  of  the  HOS  theory  of 
international  trade  have nevertheless  been  challenged  by  empirical  works  on  some  Latin 
American countries, where a combination of rising skill premium and a deterioration of their 
income distribution parallel to trade liberalization episodes seemed to take place (see, for 
example,  Robbins,  1996,  and  Goldberg  and  Pavcnik,  2007,  for  studies  on  various  Latin 
American countries; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005 and Attanasio et alii, 2004, for Colombia; 
Hanson,  2003,  for  Mexico). Recent  research  concludes  that  evaluating  the  impact  of 
globalization on income distribution within a country requires going beyond the scope of the 
predictions of HOS theory.
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The focus solely on wages and skill premium has additional shortcomings when considering 
developing  countries  experiencing  relatively  high  levels  of  poverty  and  very  unequal 
distributions  according  to  international  standards,  as  is  often  the  case  in  Latin  America 
(WDR, 2006). Among other things, developing countries are indeed characterized by larger 
shares of population who do not work for wages and an important size of the informal sector. 
The  use  of  broader  measures  of  welfare  to  study  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  has 
nevertheless  received  little attention, also  due  to  conceptual  and  measurement  difficulties, 
since comparable household poverty and inequality trends in developing countries are not 
always feasible or easy to elaborate (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2007).
3
The few empirical studies that have tried to link trade liberalization and household income 
inequality or poverty show contrasting results, depending on the methodology and country 
studied.  For  example,  Topalova  (2005)  using  a  regional  approach,  finds  that  trade 
liberalization  in  the  1987-1997  period  led to  an  increase  in  poverty  but  had  no effect  on 
inequality  in  rural  Indian  districts.  She also  finds  no  impact  of  trade  exposure  on  district 
inequality and poverty in urban India. For Vietnamese provinces and looking at short run 
effects,  McCaig  (2009)  obtained  similar  results:  between  2002  and  2004  provinces  more 
exposed to tariff cuts may have experienced lower declines in poverty while increased access 
to U.S. export markets led to greater drops in poverty. However, Porto (2003, 2006), using a 
2 For example, the literature has introduced other factors such as trade-induced skilled biased technological 
change, trade in intermediate goods or outsourcing. The initial structure of protection has also to be taken into 
account.
3 Other motives hinted in the literature have to do with the strong emphasis in U.S. literature on wage inequality, 
which may have spilled over and crowded out further issues from research agendas of other countries (Hanson, 
2005).4
different methodological approach,  finds a pro-poor effect of trade reforms in Argentina.
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Porto (2003) shows that trade reforms as well as enhanced access to foreign markets has a 
poverty-decreasing effect; Porto (2006) finds evidence of a pro-poor bias of the Mercosur 
trade agreement on Argentine families during the nineties. The fact that different conclusions 
are reached in different countries, encourages us to re-examine the question for the case of 
Brazil, a case study that may be of particular interest.
Brazil  is  remarkably  well  suited  for  analyzing  the  impact  of  globalization  on  income 
distribution and poverty for a number of reasons. First, Brazil undertook a very extensive 
trade liberalization reform since 1988, with a substantial and widespread reduction in trade 
barriers and a decline in tariff dispersion. At the end of the eighties, imports were subject to 
very high tariff barriers as well as important non-tariff barriers. Trade reforms started in 1988 
and the average (unweighted) tariff fell from 40,4% in 1988 to 11.1% in 2005. These large 
changes  in  trade  protection  and  other  macroeconomic  factors  led  to  an  increase  of  trade 
openness in Brazil as well as in the different Brazilian states (see section 2 below for a more 
detailed description of the evolution of trade policies and trade patterns).
Second,  among  Latin  American  countries,  Brazil  seems  to  be  a  special  case,  at  least 
concerning  the  literature  that  focuses  on  the  effects  of  trade  liberalization  on  wage  and 
employment  outcomes.  In  Brazil  the  economy-wide  skill-premium  fell  between  1988  and 
2004 (Ferreira et alii, 2000a) and recent studies show either no evidence or a downward effect 
of trade liberalization on wage inequality.
5 One reason that can account for these results is the 
nature of the Brazilian structure of effective protection prior to liberalization and its evolution. 
Contrary to some other Latin American countries - for example Mexico (Hanson, 2003) or 
Colombia  (Attanasio  et  alii,  2004)  -,  pre-liberalization  tariffs  in  Brazil  were  higher  in 
industries relatively intensive in skilled labor (Gonzaga et alii, 2006; Ferreira et alii, 2007a). 
The objective of the Brazilian government was to reduce tariffs across industries to more 
uniform rates. This means that reductions in tariffs were more important in skill-intensive 
industries  (Gonzaga  et alii.,  2006).  In  line  with  Stolper-Samuelson  predictions,  this could 
explain a contribution of trade liberalization to a reduction in inequality.
4 Porto studies the impact on household poverty through the estimation of general equilibrium distributional 
effects (using the channel of prices and wage price-elasticities). 
5 See Pavcnik et alii., 2003, 2004 ; Gonzaga et alii., 2006 ; Ferreira et alii., 2007a. An exception is the study of 
Arbache et alii. (2004) that found rising wage inequality in the traded sector. These studies focus on the impact 
of  trade  liberalization  on  economy-wide  skill  premium,  industry-specific  wage  and  skill  premiums  or 
employment reallocation.5
Third, Brazil is politically organised as a federation composed by twenty-seven federative 
units, among which twenty-six states plus the Distrito Federal. Being a large federal country, 
a  relatively  important  number  of  intra-national  observations  is  available.  Concerning  the 
impact of openness to trade, it is possible to measure, at the state level, not only the exposure 
to tariff cuts (by weighting tariffs with the initial share of employment by industry within 
each state), but also to international trade (since data on exports and imports are available for 
each state). Therefore we not only study the effects of tariff drops, but also of integration to 
the world markets on state poverty and inequality. We focus both on trade policy variables 
and  international  trade  flow  variables  at  the  sectoral  and  state  level,  in  an  effort  to  be 
exhaustive in assessing the distributional impacts of trade.
Moreover, a technical, but not less important reason to study the Brazilian case, is the fact that 
it benefits from the availability of very high-quality household data sets representative of 
almost the whole country and covering a period that starts before trade liberalization. It is 
therefore possible to establish long, reliable and comparable annual series at the household 
level, and consequently at the state-level. As often emphasized, within country studies do not 
suffer from the long list of data quality problems encountered by cross-countries studies (such 
as differences in data definitions and collection methods leading to problems of comparability 
between countries and over time). 
Finally, Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world while its level of poverty is 
very  high  and  well  above  the  norm  for  a  middle  income-country.  During  the  period  of 
interest,  both  welfare  indicators  started  a  slow  but  significant  decline.  Still,  there  are 
important  differences in  inequality  and  poverty  between  rural  and  urban  areas and across 
Brazilian  states,  both  in  levels  and  in  trends  (see  section  3  below  for  a  more  detailed 
description of the evolution of poverty and inequality indicators).
This paper shows that Brazilian trade liberalization increased poverty and inequality at the 
state  level  even  if,  over  the  period  studied,  Brazilian  states  experienced  in  general 
improvements in these welfare indicators. In other words, Brazilian states that were more 
exposed to tariff cuts (i.e., had a greater share of workers in industries with large tariff cuts) 
experienced smaller reductions in household poverty and inequality. Though significance of 
results  for  states  as  a  whole  seemed  dependent  on  the  choice  of  poverty  and  inequality 6
indicators, this is not the case as soon as we disaggregate into rural and urban areas within 
states. The influence of a tariff reduction is poverty and inequality increasing in urban areas 
whereas it is inequality decreasing in rural areas (but no significant effect on rural poverty 
emerges).  In  terms  of  observed  integration  to  world  markets,  the  results  are  opposite  for 
export exposure and import penetration. While import penetration plays a similar role as trade 
liberalization for Brazilian states as a whole, rising export exposure appears to have reduced 
both poverty and inequality quite significantly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of 
Brazilian trade reforms during the past two decades. Section 3 describes the data set built for 
this study (3.a) and presents descriptive statistics on trade patterns, poverty and inequality for 
Brazil  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  by  federative  units.  Section  4  describes  the  econometric 
specifications and estimation strategy (4.a) and then analyzes our results on the impact of 
trade liberalization and international trade on both poverty and inequality (4.b). Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Trade reforms in Brazil
Brazilian trade policies have considerably evolved during the past two decades. Until the end 
of the eighties, Brazil had a very restrictive trade regime, due to a development strategy based 
on the substitution of imports and the enhancement of the national industry. Not only the level 
of protection was high but the import policies were also particularly complex due to the use of 
innumerous trade instruments. Such intricacy was reinforced by the fact that, under some 
circumstances,  trade  instruments  were  used  for  macroeconomics  purposes,  without 
connection with the original industrial and productive rationale. At the end of the eighties –
known as the “lost decade” for Latin-American countries because of macro instability and 
mediocre  economic  performance  -  liberal  public  policies  inspired  on  the  Washington 
Consensus started to be adopted in the region.
6 The types and deepness of economic policies 
varied from country to country. In Brazil, the recommended policies were neither entirely nor 
simultaneously implemented, but in general trade and financial liberalization measures were 
adopted from the early nineties on. 
6 For an analysis of the Latin-American economies after the fifties, see Cano (2000) or Bethell (2001).7
Trade  reform  in  Brazil  started  effectively  in  1988,  when  some  non-tariff  barriers  were 
suppressed. At that time, the nominal tariff, measured by its simple average across sectors 
(see Figure 1) reached 40.4%, with a very dispersive distribution (tariff standard deviation 
above 15%) and an important incidence of “tariff redundancy”.
7 With the arrival of a new 
government in 1990, a great package of trade measures was implemented. The main goal of 
the reform was to rationalize the trade regime and to let the tariff play the role of main trade 
instrument. In order to reach this main goal, the reform, first, eliminated the remaining non-
tariff barriers (like prohibitions and quantitative controls), second, suppressed the majority of 
the special import regimes and, third, reduced the level and dispersion of import tariffs. A 
schedule  for  tariff  reduction  was  established,  with  the  goal  by  1994 of  nominal  tariffs 
undertaking 18% on average and ranging from 0 up to 40%. These Brazilian trade reforms 
were  initiated  as  a  unilateral  initiative,  which  was  in  accordance  with  the  commitments 
assumed by the country in the ongoing multilateral negotiations (Uruguay Round). But in 
1991, Brazil signed the Mercosur agreement with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The four 
countries negotiated the Common External Tariff (CET), which imposed some adjustments to 
the original liberalization schedule. With the Mercosur agreement, by 1996 the average tariff 




All in all, the nineties trade reforms in Brazil not only achieved its goal of rationalization of 
the import tariff structure, but also led to profound tariff cuts and more uniform tariff rates. 
After  the  implementation  of  the  CET  in  1994, only  small  changes  have  been  introduced, 
mainly conducted for macroeconomic adjustment purposes. The price stabilization after the 
Real Plan (1994) leading to a rapid import growth,  implied the imposition in 1996 of some 
quantitative and administrative measures, in order to control the rising trade deficit
.9 From 
1997 onwards the Asian financial crisis strongly impacted on external accounts and made the 
Brazilian  exchange  regime  become  unsustainable.  In  1997,  the  country,  together  with  its 
Mercosur partners, temporarily raised the CET by 3%
10 and in January 1999, the Brazilian 
7 “Tariff redundancy” means that for some products there was such a high tariff that the other tariff and non-
tariff measures had no additional effect.
8 For a more detailed analysis of Brazilian trade reform, see Kume et alii. (2003) or Pereira (2006).
9 See Figure A1 in appendix, for the evolution of international trade flows and balance.
10 This measure was abolished in 2003.8
currency was devaluated by about 50% in nominal values. Though seeked results on exports 
and imports were not immediate, these measures managed to stop the trade deficit trajectory. 
From 2001 to 2004, trade surplus grew from US$ 2 billions to US$ 33 billions and by 2005 
the Brazilian tariff had reached its lowest level with a simple average tariff of 11.1%.
11
If we look at the sectoral structure of tariff protection throughout the 1987-2005 period we 
can see the magnitude of tariff cuts as well as the dispersion drop (see Figure 2). The largest 
tariff cuts concern the sectors with initially highest tariff levels, that is, manufacturing sectors 
such as automobiles, apparel and textiles. The lowest tariff cuts concern extractive sectors, 
with initially lowest levels. The levels of protection of agriculture and food sectors – where 
Brazil benefits from strong comparative advantage – are close to the Brazilian average tariff.
12
<Figure 2>
Note  that  detailed  information  on  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  is  not  available  on  a 
disaggregated basis to construct time-series across sectors in Brazil, and has not been included 
in this study. This should not be very problematic, from the moment that tariffs are the main 
policy instrument in Brazil. Though NTBs may have played a role as a trade barrier until 
1990, since then they have become a relatively insignificant protectionist instrument.
13
All  these  changes  in  trade  protection  together  with those  occurred  in  macroeconomic 
environment and policies affected trade performance in Brazil as a whole as well as in the 
different  Brazilian  states.  Figure  3  shows  the  three  usual  indicators  of  international  trade 
exposure – trade openness, import penetration and export to output ratios – for Brazil. Since 
1989, trade openness has more than doubled, reaching 26.4% in 2004 (compared to 11.8% in 
11 Several authors (Carvalho and DeNegri, 2000; Pourchet, 2003; Ribeiro, 2006) suggest that export volumes are 
becoming  more  sensible  to  the  evolution  of  international  demand  than  to  exchange  rate.  In  2004,  the  real 
appreciation of the Brazilian currency (about 10% along the year) was not strong enough to reduce the positive 
effect of international demand on exports.
12 Though some interest groups representing the entrepreneurs might exert some influence on the trade policy 
making, in the case of Brazil it was limited to very specific sectors (see Abreu, 2004). Since Brazil committed to 
an economywide liberalization process and experienced the greatest tariff cuts in the most protected sectors, the 
question of the endogeneity of trade liberalization, that is sometimes raised when studying its impact on income 
distribution, should be less of an issue in the Brazilian case as already underlined by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2007).
13 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) emphasize that in recent years in developing countries, NTB coverage ratios and 
tariff rates (as well as their changes), whenever available, are positively correlated, indicating that they have 
been used as complements and not substitutes. In the case of Brazil, Carvalho (1992) considers that NTB’s
application before 1990 was usually done in complement with high level tariffs causing a tariff redundancy and 
having no additional effects on imports. In 1997 the Brazilian government imposed some sanitary measures, but 
they did not seem to have played an efficient role in restricting imports.9
1989 and 13.8 % in 1998).
14 Changes were more important from 1998 onwards. The large 
increase in trade openness between 1998 and 2004 is mainly due to the growth of exports, 
with a rise of almost 10% of export exposure compared to around 4% for import penetration. 
<Figure 3>
Given that our empirical framework studies the impact of openness to trade at the state level, 
a detailed description of trade exposure across Brazilian federative units is given in the next 
section, after the presentation of our different data sets.
3. Trade, poverty and inequality in Brazil: data and descriptive analysis
3.a. Data description
The data used in this study come from different sources. The first source is the household 
level micro-data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), which is 
conducted annually by the Brazilian Census Bureau, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística  (IBGE).
15  The  survey,  which  samples  about  300,000  individuals  per  year,  is 
nationally representative and ensures coverage of both rural and urban areas of all states of the 
federation, except for the rural areas of the Northern Region, corresponding to the Amazon 
rainforest.
16 From the PNAD we use individual level information to construct harmonized 
summary variables on income distribution, employment, education and various other socio-
demographic  characteristics  (detailed  below),  at  our  unit  of  analysis,  the  state.  When 
appropriate, we will make the distinction between rural and urban areas within states, for 
which all summary variables have in turn been constructed.
17
14 Note that this level continues to be low compared to other Latin American countries partly because of the large 
size of Brazil.
15 During the period of analysis, there have been three years in which the PNAD was not carried out: in 1994 for 
budgetary reasons and in 1991 and 2000, because they were census years.
16 The rural areas not covered by the PNAD until 2003 and therefore excluded from our analysis, correspond 
specifically to the states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia and Roraima, which, according to census 
data, represent about 2.3% of the Brazilian population. According to the PNAD surveys, in 1987 about 77 
percent of the population was living in urban areas and in 2005 this share reached 86 percent, without the 6 states 
here cited. 
17 The  number  of  states  considered  in  this  study  is  twenty-six.  Tocantins  was  created  in  1988  as  a 
dismemberment of Goiás state, but the distinction among the two states was not made in the PNAD before 1992. 
Due to the exclusion of rural areas in the Northern region before 2003, the number of cross-sectional units will 
be of twenty-six in urban areas and twenty in rural areas. 10
The  definition  of  income  used  throughout  the  analysis  corresponds  to  gross  monthly 
household income per capita, measured in 2006 Brazilian Reais, and the sample considered is 
the total population.
18 Various measures of inequality and poverty have been considered for 
the sake of robustness. In the case of inequality, we apply two well-known measures, the Gini 
and  the  Theil  indices.  When  looking  at  poverty,  again  two  standard  poverty  measures 
belonging to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family are calculated: the headcount index 
and the poverty gap.
19 The first one captures the proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line and the second one allows us to account for differences among households in the 
distance to the poverty line. The poverty line is here set at R$100 per person per month (in 
2006 values), though robustness to the choice of threshold has been tested.
20 In an effort to 
better gauge what is happening behind these summary statistics, we will also calculate income 
levels  across  quintiles  (and  deciles)  of  the  income  distribution  and  include  them  in  our 
econometric study.
The PNAD provides us with information at the individual level that can be exploited for our 
econometric analysis. We are able to observe, among other things, the labor market status of 
individuals in the population, as well as the industrial sector in which they work.
21 We are 
also able to observe a list of individual socio-demographic variables usually considered as 
determinants of income levels. From such individual-level data we construct different control 
variables, at the level of the state (or the rural/urban areas within states), in particular: the 
share of individuals in each state by years of schooling (grouped in six categories: none; 1 to 
3 years; 4 to 7 years; 8 to 10 years; 11 to 14 years and 15 or more years) , the share of 
individuals in each “race” group (information on “race” is self-declared in the PNAD and 
distinguishes  five  groups:  indigenous,  white,  black,  Asian  and  mixed),  the  share  of  the 
18 Monetary values are inflated to the September 2006 prices using the IBGE deflators derived from the INPC 
national consumer price index (see Corseuil and Foguel, 2002; Cogneau and Gignoux, 2009). 











α where z is the 
poverty line, yi is the household’s per capita income level, n is the number of households, q is the number of 
poor households and α is a parameter determining the weight given to the distance of households to the poverty 
line. An α equal to zero gives us the headcount ratio and an α equal to one represents the poverty gap.
20 Though Brazil does not have an official poverty line, an ad-hoc administrative poverty line of about R$100, 
corresponding to the means-test in Brazil’s main new cash assistance program, Bolsa Familia, is gaining usage in 
the research community (see Ferreira et alii, 2006). As a robustness check, a poverty line of R$75 has also been 
tested. 
21 Labor-market variables are available from the PNAD for individuals aged ten years or more. We will consider 
this population for all labor-market variables as well as for education variables in each state. The classification of 
industrial sectors used in this paper is given in Table A1 of the appendix.11
agricultural sector
22 in each state, the share of the informal workers, the share of workers by 
industrial sector. 
In order to represent trade policy changes and openness to trade of Brazilian states, we use 
two different sets of measures. The first set comprises trade policy based measures, built on 
Brazilian nominal tariff data. The second set  focuses on trade flows and reveals a state’s 
exposure to international trade, or its integration to world markets.  
The  data  on  trade  policy  are  industry-specific nominal  tariff  rates.  These  are  drawn  from 
Kume et alii. (2003) for the 1987-1994 period. For the 1995-2005 years, data were made 
available by H. Kume. The tariff data series correspond to the nominal level of protection for 
31 industry sectors.
23 These data are a standard source on the Brazilian tariff structure. 
Since we adopt a regional approach, we follow Topalova (2005) and construct an indicator to 
measure the influence of trade policy and its change at the state level in Brazil (and at the 
level of urban and rural areas within states). This indicator, called LIB, is a weighted average 
of  national  industry-level  tariffs,  where  the  weights  correspond  to  the  initial  share  of 












where s stands for the unit of analysis (the Brazilian states), k for the sector and t for time.
Tariffkt refers to the tariff in the sector k for the year t, Lsk1987 to the workers employed in the 
sector k for the year 1987 in the unit of analysis s and Ls1987 to the total workers in the unit of 
analysis s for the year 1987. 
The weights are calculated with data on employment for a year prior to trade reform, here 
1987, ensuring that employment changes over time due to tariff variation are not included in
22 The share of agricultural sector takes into account the number of individuals that declare their industrial sector 
to be either agriculture or agri-food industries.
23 These  31  sector-specific ad-valorem tariff levels correspond to weighted averages  of more  disaggregated 
product-specific ad-valorem tariffs, where the weights are the value added in each narrowly defined product 
group. 12
our LIB measure of exposure to the tariff reforms. The data on employment by federative unit 
and industry in 1987 were drawn from the PNAD. Our use of household survey and tariff data 
with different industry definitions required a concordance between the two datasets. To match 
the  data  on  tariffs  (in  the  classification  nivel  50)  and  employment  (in  the  PNAD 
classification), we used the Table A1 of Industry Concordance (in the appendix) developed by 
Ferreira  et  alii.  (2007a).  As  a  result  of  this  procedure,  we  are  able  to  compute  our  trade 
liberalization  indicator  LIB  for  a  group  of  22  industries,  in  a  sample  of  twenty-six  states 
through the period 1987-2005.
24
The data on trade flows is composed by the following indicators: import penetration (imports 
as  a  percentage  of  output  plus  net  imports),  export  exposure  (exports  as  a  percentage  of 
output) and trade openness (defined as the ratio of imports plus exports on gross domestic 
product). These ratios are calculated at the state-level and no urban-rural distinction within 
states is possible in this case. Trade data on imports and exports of federative units in current 
US  dollars  are  collected  by  the  Secretaria  de  comércio  exterior  (SECEX),  Ministério  do 
Desenvolvimento,  Industria  e  Comércio  Exterior  (MDIC).
25 The  series  on  gross  domestic 
product  by  state  in  current  market  prices  come  from  the  regional  accounts  of  Brazil 
established  by  IBGE.  These  data  were  converted  in  current  US  dollars,  using  the  annual 
average  exchange  rates.
26  The  trade  flow  indicators  are calculated  for  total trade  but  also 
separately for the agricultural sector and the industrial sector (the latter including extractive 
and manufacturing industries) for the period 1989-2004.
3.b. Trade, poverty and inequality in Brazilian states
24 The original data provide the tariff levels for 31 sectors at the Nivel 50 industrial classification. We have 
aggregated the data by taking simple averages of reported tariffs (after verifying the high correlation of both 
series, unweighted and weighted by import penetration), so that the tariff information now matches the level of 
industry aggregation in the labor force data (22 industries). 
25 These data series are only available since 1989 (see http://aliceweb.desenvolvimento.gov.br/default.asp). Note 
that according to the SECEX, the state that exports is the one where agricultural products are cultivated, ores 
extracted and manufactured goods produced totally or partially. In this last case, the “exporting” state is the one 
that has completed the last step of the manufacturing process.
26 As the first years of our period of study were characterized by high inflation rates, the choice of the exchange 
rates matters.  Therefore, robustness to this choice was tested through another method of calculation. Using 
states’s GDP series of the IBGE in current market prices, we have calculated the share of each state in the total 
Brazilian GDP. The GDP of each state was then calculated by applying these shares to Brazil’s GDP in current 
dollars  from  the  database  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI,  World  Bank).  The  two  methods  give  very 
similar values for the whole period under study.13
Before  estimating the  distributional  effects  of  international  trade  in  Brazilian  states,  it is 
useful to show how heterogeneous are Brazilian states in terms of their exposure to trade and 
their poverty and inequality experiences.
A detailed picture of trade patterns by Brazilian federative units in 1989 and 2004 is given in 
Figure  4.  Values  observed  show  important  spatial  inequalities  with  a  high  level  of  trade 
exposure of some Brazilian states.
27 If trade openness has increased in each state during the
period under study, disparities between the different federative units have also grown: the 
“average” level of trade openness for the twenty-six states rose from 8% to 19.6% (standard 
deviations being 0.07 and 0.16 respectively). In 2004, trade openness ratios range from 0.9% 
in  Acre  (a  state  covered  mostly  by  the  jungle  of  the  Amazon  Rainforest)  to  44.8%  in 
Amazonas  (whose  main  economic  activities  are  concentrated  in  the  free-export  zone  of 
Manaus) and 59.9% in Espírito Santo (a state with an extensive coastline that comprises some 




Figure 4 also maps the separate levels of export exposure and import penetration ratios of 
Brazilian states, both in 1989 and 2004. Some Brazilian states exhibit a very important rise of 
export to output ratios during this period. In 1989, only five states reached an export exposure 
above 10%; in 2004 it is the case of twelve states, with four states above 25%: Espírito Santo 
and Pará - two states in which exports of iron ore play a major role -, Mato Grosso and 
Paraná, where soybean exports are very important. The evolutions are more modest for import 
penetration: in 1989, ratios are below 5% in all the Brazilian states except Amazonas, Rio de 
Janeiro, Espírito Santo and Rio Grande do Sul. In 2004, only eight states have ratios above 
10%, with Amazonas and Espirito Santo showing levels above 25%. In line with what was 
observed  for  Brazil  as  a  whole,  it  is  mainly  the  growth  of  exports  that  accounts  for  the 
increase in trade openness in the different federative units.
27 Brazil  is  a  very  large  country  where  trade  policies  but  also  distance,  natural  barriers  to  trade,  transport 
infrastructure or access to major seaports play an important role concerning trade integration of the different 
federative units.
28 Mato Grosso (36.9%), Parana (36.1%), Para (34.8%), Maranhao (34.8%), Sao Paulo (31.2%) and Rio Grande 
do Sul (31.1%).14
Note that an important feature of the Brazilian case is its strong geographical concentration of 
exports and imports. In 2004, three states
29 represent more than 50% of total Brazilian exports 
while twenty states have a share in total exports below 5%. Geographical concentration of 
imports is even more important, even if it has fallen since 1989: while twenty one states have 
a share in total imports below 5% in 2004, three states
30 represent more than 60% of total 
Brazilian imports.
From this analysis, it follows that integration to world markets was very uneven across the 
different federative units at the end of the eighties and that these regional inequalities in terms 
of trade exposure have increased during the last two decades. This variation across space and 
over time in trade patterns in Brazil might  play a role on the different evolutions of state 
inequality and poverty levels.
Figures 5a and 5b show respectively the evolution of two of the most common indicators of 
inequality and poverty, the Gini index and the headcount ratio. The trends are provided for 
Brazil as a whole as well as separately for rural and urban areas, over the period 1987 to 2005.
The evolution of the Gini index reveals a steady increase of inequality from 1987 to 1989 
(where a peak is reached at 0.63), followed by a certain degree of volatility until 1993. Usual 
explanations of such evolution include high and accelerating inflation over the period, as well 
as increasing education levels of the population, together with widening returns to schooling 
(see  Ferreira  and  Paes de  Barros,  2004).  From  1993  to  2005  an  initially  slow  but  steady 
decline of inequality took place (from 0.60 in 1993, by 2005 the value of 0.56 was reached). 
Such decline was more intense in rural areas than in urban zones and particularly significant 
from 2001 onwards. When looking at poverty indicators over the same period we observe a 
similar pattern. The headcount ratio displays fluctuating values from 1987 to 1993, again 
reflecting  macroeconomic  instability  and  hyperinflation.  From  1993  to 1995, a fall  in  the 
poverty  headcount  is  observed.  The  introduction  of  the  Organic  Social  Assistance  law  in 
1993, which consisted essentially of unconditional cash transfers to poor old people living in 
rural areas and to the handicapped, together with the Real Plan in 1994, are usually cited 
among the relevant contributors to this initial poverty reduction (Ferreira et alii., 2006; Pero 
and Szerman, 2009). A period of relative stability in the percentage of poor at around 33% 
29 Sao Paulo (35% in 1989 and 32.2% in 2004), Minas Gerais (respectively 13.7% and 10.4%) and Rio Grande 
do Sul (respectively 10.8% and 10.2%)
30 Sao Paulo (41% in 1989 and 43.1% in 2004), Rio de Janeiro (respectively 23.7% and 10.1%), Rio Grande do 
Sul (respectively 10.7% and 8.4%)15
followed from 1995 until 2003 (though in rural areas poverty ratios continued a slow and 
steady decline). Finally, a persistent and significant fall in poverty ratios took place from 2003 
onwards, this time both in urban and rural areas (the headcount index reaching 29% for Brazil 
in 2005).
31
<Figures 5a and 5b>
Concerning the spatial dimension, when we look at the period of analysis 1987-2005, not only 
there are important differences in inequality and poverty between rural and urban areas, but 
also across Brazilian states, both in levels and in trends. Figure 6a and Figure 6b show the 
initial and final years’ measures of, respectively, Gini coefficients and headcount ratios in 
Brazilian states. Though inequality has fallen in almost all federative units
32, the intensity of 
the drop varies across states. A similar spatial heterogeneity of experiences is observed when 
looking at poverty levels. In fact, no convergence across states seems to have taken place 
during the time frame of analysis. 
<Figures 6a and 6b>
The aim of this paper is to investigate if the rich spatial variation in welfare outcomes and 
trends observed in Brazil is linked to the one observed in the degree of trade exposure of 
Brazilian states. Our estimation strategy and results are described in the next section.
4. Impact of trade liberalization on inequality and poverty
4.a. Econometric specification.
31 A few tentative explanations for these more recent declines in inequality and poverty levels in Brazil have 
been  put  forward  by  the  research  community,  among  which:  the  observed  declines  in  inequality  between 
educational subgroups of population (due to a reduction in the educational heterogeneity of the labor force 
together with a compression in the distribution of returns to education), a better integration of rural and urban 
labor  markets,  a  potential  reduction  of  “racial”  inequalities  and  the  increase  and  better  targeting  of  social 
transfers, with the adoption and expansion of conditional cash transfer programs (Ferreira et alii., 2006; Ferreira 
et alii, 2007b; Paes de Barros et alii., 2006).
32 The only exceptions are the two wealthy states of Distrito Federal and more importantly Sao  Paulo, plus 
Rondonia, Acre, Roraima, Amapa –four states in the North of Brazil, a low-income cluster in the country for 
which only urban data are available .16
To empirically estimate the effect of trade liberalization on inequality and poverty at the state 
level  (or  at  the  level  of  rural  and  urban  areas  within  states),  our  main  econometric 
specification is of the form:
st t s
i
ist i st st X TradeLib y ε γ λ β θ + + + + = ∑ (1)
where  st y  denotes the level of inequality/poverty in state s at time period t. As described in 
the  data  subsection,  different  income  distribution  measures  are  used  as  our  dependent 
variable: the Gini and the Theil indices to capture inequality and the headcount ratio and 
poverty gap indices to capture poverty levels. 
In this study, TradeLibst is the key variable and we use two measures for it: a measure based 
on  trade  policy  (our  indicator  LIB  described  above)  and  indicators  based  on  trade  flows 
(lagged  import  penetration,  lagged  export  exposure  and  lagged  trade  openness).  All  these 
indicators  represent  different  ways  of capturing  the  degree  of  trade exposure  of  Brazilian 
states. Hence, θ  is the parameter of primary interest. 
The vector Xist includes i control variables typically assumed to affect levels of poverty and 
inequality.  Our  main  specification  includes as  controls:  the  share  of  individuals  declaring 
themselves  as  “white”  in  each  state  (to  account  for  “racial”  inequalities);  the  share  of 
individuals by different levels of years of schooling in each state (to consider the role of 
educational inequalities), the share of the informal workers in each state and the size of the 
agricultural sector in each state (both well known determinants of the income distribution).
Finally,  s λ  and Ȗt are the state and time specific fixed effects respectively and  st ε  is the error 
term. 
Based  on  regional  data,  this  paper  seeks  to  answer  the  question  of  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalization  on  regional  outcomes,  or  more  precisely  within  states.  An  underlying 
assumption in this type of analysis is that labor should not be too mobile across states within 
Brazil at least in the short or medium run (there would be no differential effects throughout 
the  country  if  wages,  and  consequently  household  income  levels,  were  equalized  across 
regions). However, as emphasized by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p.56), “failure of this 
premise to hold in practice does not invalidate the approach; it simply implies that one would 
not find any differential trade policy effects across industries/regions in this case”. In the case 17
of  Brazil,  even  though  geographical  migration  is  not  negligible  throughout  the  period  of 
study, it is not sizeable enough to wipe off the spatial disparities in experiences observed.
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4.b. Empirical findings
4.b.i. Trade policy, poverty and inequality.
The estimated effects of our trade policy indicator LIB on poverty are presented in Table 1a. 
The table reports equation (1) estimated using both the headcount ratio and the poverty gap 
index as poverty indicators. For each dependent variable, results are reported using the state 
as a whole as unit of analysis (columns 1 and 4), but since rural and urban areas within states 
may be very different, we also examine equation (1) separately for urban areas (columns 2 
and 5) and rural areas (columns 3 and 6) within states. 
Table 1a shows a negative effect of our trade policy indicator LIB on poverty when we look at 
the  state  level  (columns  1  and  4),  though  only  statistically  significant  when  poverty  is 
measured by the poverty gap (and only significant at 10%). This means that, at the state level, 
trade liberalization might contribute to poverty increases. In other words, even if over the 
period studied Brazilian states experienced in general a fall in poverty, Brazilian states that 
were more affected by tariff reductions experienced smaller reductions in poverty (at least in 
terms  of  the  poverty  gap  index).  Our  estimation  suggests that,  on  average  a  fall  of  one 
percentage point in the trade policy indicator LIB would lead to an increase in the poverty gap 
of 0.16 percentage point.
The fact that rural and urban areas within states are very different may be behind our low 
significance  levels  when  the  state  as  a  whole  is  used  as  unit  of  analysis.  In  fact,  if  we 
concentrate on urban areas only (columns 2 and 5), the negative effect of trade liberalization 
on poverty is highly significant and the size of coefficients on our trade policy indicator LIB is 
33 To get insight of geographical migration in Brazil, we use PNAD surveys: since 1992, the percentage of 
individuals that declare themselves living in the same state for the past 10 years is close to 90%. Only about 5% 
declare  themselves  as  being  living  in  their  state  during  less  than  4  years.  These  percentages  are  obtained 
considering the total population. Other studies, such as for example Fiess and Verner (2003) find a much larger 
percentage of migrants (they present numbers that go up to 40%). However they only focus on household heads 
(and not total population), and they classify them as migrants from the moment that they have migrated at least 
once  during  their  entire  lifetime.  Indeed  in  a  footnote  they  indicate  that  their  methodology  overestimates 
migration numbers, with respect to what the Brazilian Census data show.18
also larger, no matter which poverty measure is used. On average a fall of one percentage 
point in the trade policy indicator LIB in urban areas of states would lead to an increase in the 
headcount  ratio  of  0.67  percentage  point,  and  an  increase  in  the  poverty  gap  of  0.23 
percentage point.  On the other side, no significant effect is observed in rural areas (columns 3 
and 6).
In the estimation of equation (1) we included a few control variables that are considered to be 
usual determinants of poverty and inequality. Concerning our poverty results in Table 1a, 
controls are almost all highly significant and have the expected signs. Education is almost 
always significant and lowers poverty at practically all levels of education, while an increase 
in  the  share  of  informal  workers  leads  to  a  significant  rise  in  poverty.  The  size  of  the 
agricultural sector in a state matters: it leads to a significant rise in poverty.
34 As expected, 
informal jobs and agricultural employment show up as significant determinants of poverty.
The share of individuals declaring themselves as “white” is never significant.
<Tables 1a and 1b>
Table 1b documents the relationship between trade liberalization and inequality. When we 
consider the state as a whole as unit of analysis (columns 1 and 4), our trade policy indicator 
is inequality increasing, but the effect is only significant using the Theil index. In other words, 
Brazilian  states  that  were  more  affected  by  tariff  cuts  experienced  smaller  reductions  in 
inequality (at least in terms of the Theil index). However, opposing and significant patterns 
emerge when we consider urban and rural areas separately, these patterns being robust to the 
choice of inequality measure. The influence of a tariff reduction is inequality increasing in 
urban areas (columns 2 and 5) and inequality decreasing in rural zones (columns 3 and 6).
35
34 Our variable capturing the size of the agricultural sector is not significant in rural areas, where almost all 
economic activity concerns agriculture. In any case, our results on the variable of interest LIB are robust to the 
omission of this variable.
35 Note that the relationship between control variables and inequality is less straightforward than in the case of 
poverty. In particular, the interpretation of schooling levels is not easy. When we look at the distribution of the 
population  among  different  levels  of  schooling,  the  only  category  for  which  we  obtain  a  consistent  and 
significant coefficient, concerns the most educated. The share of adults with more than 15 years of schooling (or 
more  than  10  years  in  rural  areas)  unequivocally  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  inequality  (such 
individuals are eventually  those at the highest end  of the income  distribution). An increase in the share  of 
informal workers in a state leads to a rise in inequality, except for rural areas where no significant effect is 
found. Finally, other control variables (the share of individuals declaring themselves as “white” or the size of the 
agricultural sector) are insignificant or not robust to the choice of inequality measure. 19
One  tentative  explanation  for  our  contrasting  effects  of  trade  liberalization  on  household 
poverty  and  inequality  between  urban  and  rural  areas  could  be  that  urban  workers  –
essentially employed in the manufacturing industries and in the service sector – suffered the 
most from the liberalization process. Previous research on Brazil has established that trade 
liberalization  led  to  a  decline  in  economy-wide wage  inequality  (Gonzaga  et  alii,  2006; 
Ferreira et alii, 2007a). At the same time, recent evidence on labor reallocations in response to 
trade  reforms  shows  labor  displacements  from  import  competing  industries,  but  neither 
comparative-advantage  industries  nor  exporters  seem  to  have  absorbed  trade-displaced 
workers  for  years.  Indeed,  more  frequent  transitions  to  informal  work  status  and 
unemployment  are  observed  (Menezes  and  Muendler,  2007).  These  transitions  may  be 
sources  of  poverty  and  inequality  increases  and  these  effects  are  captured  when  total 
household income (and not only wages) is considered. If these adjustments played a relatively 
more important role in urban areas than other inequality decreasing mechanisms, they may be 
behind our poverty and inequality increasing results in urban areas, and may also help explain 
the differences between rural and urban results. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, 
our  results  suggest  that  a  better  understanding  of  the  effects  of  trade  liberalization on 
household  income  distribution  should take  into account  not  only  the  observed  changes  in 
labor income, but also if trade-induced changes in household composition and occupational 
situation of all household members have occurred.
36
Note also that trade liberalization was more intense in manufacturing sectors, with major tariff 
reductions  taking  place  from  1990  onwards  (see  section  2). For  agricultural  sectors,  the 
reduction  in  protection  was  less  important  from  1990  onwards  and  Brazil  has  strong 
comparative advantages in these sectors, where an important rise in exports has occurred (see 
subsection 4.b.ii).
37 So when only rural areas within states are considered, it is not surprising 
36 To our knowledge, the only study that has tempted to investigate the implications for household income 
distribution of trade-driven changes in wages is Ferreira et alii (2007a). Using earnings-based simulations and 
looking at Brazil as a whole, they observe that reductions in wage inequality appear to extend to declines  in 
household income poverty and inequality. However, as the authors recognize, their “earnings-based simulations 
are not the most suitable way for understanding differences between full household income distributions” (p.31), 
as the indirect impacts of trade on family composition or on occupational decisions of household members other 
than the spouses are not considered. Though our framework of analysis is not comparable, since our units of 
analysis are Brazilian states and not Brazil as a whole, our differential results across urban and rural areas should 
encourage additional research on the various trade-transmission channels that operate for household income 
distributions. Ferreira et alii (2007a) point, for example, to the use of more general specifications of micro-
simulation models (Bourguignon et alii, 2004) to study the welfare impacts of trade reforms.
37 The average tariff for agricultural products remained under 10% since 1989 whereas the average tariff for all 
products still exceeded 30% in 1989 and remained since then above 10%.20
to find no significant effects in terms of poverty from trade liberalization and to even have 
levels of inequality reduced if anything. 
Another reason for observed differences in results on poverty and inequality across urban and 
rural areas may be related to a differential role of social transfers. In particular, due to the 
major role of conditional cash transfer programs in poverty reduction, we were concerned that 
if  these  transfers  were  correlated  with  exposure  to  trade,  their  omission  would  result  in 
omitted variable bias. Unfortunately with our data we cannot identify the sources of income 
of individuals (and more specifically transfers received) for the whole period of analysis nor 
can we capture federal expenditures by state.
38 But we know that conditional cash transfer 
programs were initially implemented in a few municipalities, to be then launched nationwide 
in 2001 (essentially with the introduction of Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação programs, 
then unified and amplified in the Bolsa Familia program in 2003). We decided to re-run our 
regressions excluding the period 2001-2005 and our results are still robust. Though the size of 
our coefficient on trade liberalization falls in poverty and inequality regressions by around 
30% on average, we still observe opposing and significant effects across urban and rural areas 
within states.
To sum up, our results show that trade liberalization, measured by our indicator LIB, increases 
poverty and inequality in Brazilian states, though these effects are mildly significant. The 
distinction  between  rural  and  urban  areas  gives  more  insight  on  the  effect  of  trade 
liberalization. In urban areas we observe a negative and always significant effect for both 
poverty and inequality. In rural zones, the sign of the effect of trade liberalization is reversed 
(though significant only when looking at inequality). Our findings on state poverty are in line 
with recent results for Indian districts (Topalova, 2005), even though no parallel significant
effect on inequality is found in India. Note that the poverty increase due to trade liberalization 
observed in India takes place in the rural world, while in Brazil it appears to occur in urban 
areas. While, in the case of India, sectors that have been relatively more affected by tariff 
reductions are concentrated in rural districts, descriptive evidence for Brazil (Figure 2) shows 
38 We could only construct series of local social security and social assistance expenditures made by states. But 
these variables only capture a minimal part of public transfers received by households and proved irrelevant. 
Besides, the role that the establishment of rural pensions may have played in rural areas cannot be taken into 
account, because PNAD surveys do not allow us to identify these sources of income for the whole period of 
analysis. 21
that trade liberalization was more intense in manufacturing sectors, typically implanted on 
urban zones.
We have investigated whether these results are robust to the choice of the indicator on trade 
liberalization. In our trade policy measure LIB, tariffs are weighted by the number of workers
in each industry as a share of total employment in each state. Some authors (Topalova, 2005; 
Edmonds  et  alii,  2007)  raised  the  question  of  considering  employment  only  in  “tariff-
protected” industries. Therefore, an alternative indicator LIB2 is also constructed where the 

















where s stands for the unit of analysis, k for the sector and t for time.
A problem with LIB2 is that it does not reflect the size of the traded sector within a state. 
Consider two states with the same structure of employment in “tariff-protected” industries; 
the indicator will now have by construction the same value across the two states even if shares 
of  workers  in  “tariff-protected”  industries  on  total  employment  are  very  different. As  a 
consequence, the magnitude of trade policy effects may be overstated by construction with 
LIB2. To overcome this problem another estimation strategy, instrumenting LIB by LIB2, is 
implemented.  In  both  cases  we  obtain  similar  effects  of  trade  policy  on  our  income 
distribution variables at the state level: when significant, the effect of trade liberalization is 
poverty and inequality increasing (see tables A2 and A3 in the appendix). 
Additional robustness checks have been performed. In particular,  we estimated regressions 
without states that can be considered as outliers, like Distrito Federal and Amazonas. On one 
hand, Distrito Federal (Brasília) has a very peculiar productive, labor and revenue pattern 
from the rest of the country as it is a fundamentally administrative city which concentrates the 
major part of national government activities. Amazonas, on the other hand, benefits from 
special trade regimes because of the status of “free trade zone”   detained by the Manaus 
industrial area. Regarding poverty, a different poverty line of R$75 was also tested. In all 
cases our main results hold.
39
39 All robustness estimations are available from the authors upon request. 22
4.b.ii. International trade, poverty and inequality
Brazil  is  one  of  the  few  countries  where  international  trade  flows  can  be  observed  and 
measured by federative units, and where the number of units of analysis allows the use of a 
regression framework to study the effects on state poverty and inequality of trade openness, 
import penetration and export exposure. These indicators reflect the degree of integration of 
Brazilian states to world markets. Note that they differ from our LIB measure based on tariffs 
cuts. They are not exclusively influenced by trade policies, as trade flows are also determined 
by other factors such as transport costs, macroeconomic measures, factor endowments, the 
country’s size and geographical situation, etc. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between 
the effects of imports and exports on poverty and inequality. The responses of poverty and 
inequality indices to our  trade flows based measures are documented in tables 2a and 2b 
respectively. Because it is not possible to have data on trade flows separately for rural and 
urban areas within states, we only provide evidence using the state as a whole as unit of 
analysis. However, in an effort to study the influence of trade  integration on poverty and 
inequality  at  a  more  disaggregated  level,  we  have  constructed  import  and  export  ratios 
separately for agricultural and industrial sectors. These results are shown in Table 3. 
Table  2a  presents  the  results  on  poverty  incidence  (columns  1  and  2)  and  poverty  depth 
(columns 3 and 4). For each poverty measure, two specifications are tested to capture the 
effect of international trade: (i) the inclusion of a measure of lagged trade openness (defined 
as the ratio of imports plus exports on gross domestic product) and (ii) the inclusion of lagged 
import penetration and lagged export exposure ratios simultaneously. A similar specification 
structure is followed in Table 2b to capture the impact of international trade on both Gini and 
Theil inequality measures. 
<Tables 2a and 2b>
Two noteworthy results emerge. First, for both poverty and inequality, trade openness has no 
significant impact, no matter which income distribution measure is used (see coefficient on 
the variable Trade opennesss(t-1) in columns 1 and 3 of both Tables 2a and 2b). However, a 
different  picture  emerges  from  the  moment  we  dig  into  the  separate  influence  of  export 
exposure and import penetration (see coefficients on the variables Export exposures(t-1) and 
Import  penetrations(t-1) in  columns  2  and  4  of  both  Tables  2a  and  2b):  the  rise  in  export 23
exposure appears to have reduced poverty and inequality quite significantly while the growth 
of import penetration has increased both income distribution measures. If we evaluate the 
magnitude of coefficients, from column 2 in Table 2a we see that a rise of one percentage 
point  in  import  penetration  experienced  in  a  state  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  poverty 
incidence  of  0.23  percentage  point  (significance  is  lost  for  our  poverty  depth  measure  in 
column 4). For export exposure, a percentage point rise would, on the contrary, lead to a fall 
in  poverty  of  -0.12  using  the  headcount  ratio  (-0.07  with  the  poverty  gap).  Concerning 
inequality, a rise of one percentage point in import penetration increases the Gini coefficient 
of 0.12 percentage point (0.34 for the Theil index), while a percentage point rise in export 
exposure would lead to a variation in the Gini coefficient of -0.11 percentage point (-0.33 in 
the Theil index). 
To sum up, we see that import penetration yields results that are consistent with our findings 
obtained with the trade policy based measure: a rise in the import penetration ratio increases 
poverty  incidence  and  inequality  at  the  state  level.  At  the  same  time,  tariff  cuts  -when 
significant- were also related, at the state level, to rising poverty and inequality levels On the 
contrary, trade integration through rising export ratios clearly contributes to a fall in poverty 
and inequality.
In  Brazil, agricultural exports  have experienced  a  rapid  growth  (551%  between  1989  and 
2004 in current dollars), much larger than the increase of industrial exports (168% on the 
same period). On the other side, agricultural imports have grown less than industrial imports 
(36% against 268%).
40 Concerning trade intensity, export exposure and import penetration 
ratios  are  in  2004  considerably  stronger  for  industry  (the  state’s  average  export  exposure 
ratios for industry and agriculture were respectively 32.4 and 8.5 in 2004; in turn, the state’s 
average import penetration ratios reached 37.9 and 22.8).  To see if differential effects on 
income distribution measures appear according to the sector concerned, Table 3 presents the 
effects of international trade on poverty (columns 1 and 2) and inequality (columns 3 and 4) 
when export and import ratios are constructed separately for the agricultural and the industrial 
sectors (the latter including extractive industries).
<Table 3>
40 Agricultural imports in Brazil are negligible, when related to domestic consumption and production.24
Our results show, once more, an opposite sign for export exposure and import penetration 
effects on welfare both for industry and agriculture. In the industrial sector as well as in the 
agricultural  sector,  export  exposure  has  reduced  poverty  and  inequality  while  import 
penetration  (when  significant)  has  increased  both  welfare  measures.  In  sum,  no  clear 
differential effect is observed between the industrial and agricultural sectors in terms of the 
impact of trade exposure on poverty and inequality. 
4.b.iii. The effect of trade exposure on income distribution: quintile analysis
When summary inequality measures such as the Gini or the Theil index are used, we cannot 
easily tell where about in the income distribution variations are taking place. In an effort to 
better seize how trade liberalization affects the shape of the entire income distribution in each 
state, instead of just focusing on summary statistics of poverty and inequality, we have also 
estimated income levels for each quintile (and also by decile) in each state s at time t, and run 
the additional set of equations:
st t s
i
ist i st stj X TradeLib y ε γ λ β θ + + + + = ∑ (2)
Where  stj y  denotes the relative income level of the j-th quintile (or decile) normalized by the 
mean, in state s at time period t.  
<Table 4>
Table 4 presents a summary of all our estimations of equation (2) for each quintile
41. For the 
sake of simplicity, only the values and standard errors of the coefficients on our variables of 
interest are reported, that is: (i) on our trade policy indicator LIB using the whole state as unit 
of analysis; (ii) then considering only urban areas within states; (iii) and  only rural areas 
within states; (iv) on our indicator of lagged trade openness; (v) and finally on our measures 
of  lagged  import  penetration  and  export  exposure  ratios  simultaneously  included  in  the 
regression. 
41 Complete  quintile  regressions  are  available  from  the  authors  upon  request.  Decile  regressions  leading  to 
similar results were as well estimated and are also available.25
Though no significant effect is found for trade policy measure LIB at the state level, no matter 
which quintile regression is considered, there is evidence of growing (falling) inequality in 
urban (rural) areas linked to trade liberalization: this comes from coefficients sharing a similar 
positive (negative) sign in all quintiles except the highest one, where the sign is reversed. 
Distributional changes due to trade liberalization are therefore observed along the income 
ladder (and particularly significant for the first, second and fifth quintiles). Concerning our 
trade flows based variables, the quintile regressions reveal again no significant effect of trade 
openness.  However  export  exposure  increases  the  relative  income  levels  of  all  quintiles 
except the last one that presents the opposite sign, while import penetration increases the 
relative income levels of the upper quintile and decreases the relative income levels of the 
others quintiles (these effects being significant for almost all quintile levels). An interesting 
fact in Table 4 comes from the inspection of coefficient sizes by quintile. Independently of the 
variable  chosen  to  measure  trade  exposure  and  of  the  levels  of  disaggregation  in  state 
population (state as a whole, urban or rural areas within states), the impact on relative income 
levels  of  quintiles  is  non-monotonic.  Coefficients  of  the  second  quintile  group  are 
systematically larger than those of the first quintile counterpart, but not necessarily lower than 
those of the third or fourth quintile. In a sense, the effects of exposure to trade, though fully 
shared across the whole income ladder, seem relatively less strong among the poorest of the 
poor and middle quintile groups. The fact that the poorest of the poor are less affected then 
those households closer to the poverty line can be seen as hinted by results on our two poverty 
measures  in  previous  regressions.  When  looking  at  the  effects  of  our  trade  liberalization 
variables  on  both poverty  incidence  and  poverty  depth  (Table  1a),  coefficients  are 
systematically lower in the second case (last three columns versus first three columns), when 
distance to the poverty line is taken into account.  
5. Conclusion
Brazil has undergone an extensive trade liberalization reform since 1988 that has changed 
significantly the level of protection of the Brazilian economy. Since the nineties, Brazil has 
also  experienced  a  slow  but  significant  decline  in  both  poverty  and  inequality  indicators, 
though high levels of inequality and persistent poverty remain, with important geographical 
differences. Can we establish a causal link between changes in trade policies and international 26
trade flows and changes in poverty and inequality during the past two decades across regions 
in Brazil? Is this effect different in rural and urban areas? 
Assembling  various  data  sources,  this  paper  seeks  to  quantify  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalization  and  international  trade  on  household  income  inequality  and  poverty  across 
Brazilian states from 1987 to 2005. In particular, we measure if states that were more heavily 
exposed to trade experienced relatively smaller or larger changes in household poverty and 
inequality  than  less exposed  states.  Our  main contributions  to  the  literature  are  threefold. 
First, by using sub-national units of observation (in our case, the Brazilian states, together 
with the distinction between rural and urban areas within states), this paper adds up to the 
recent literature that includes a spatial dimension in the study of trade liberalization effects on 
income distribution. Second, due to the availability of long series of household surveys of 
remarkable quality, various measures of household poverty and inequality at the state level 
were calculated, which allows to include in the analysis not only how trade affects workers, 
but also their dependents and people involved in non-traded sectors. Finally, it is one among 
the few studies that consider both trade policy variables and international trade flow variables 
(at the sectoral level), in an effort to be exhaustive in assessing the distributional impacts of 
trade.
Our results show that, whatever the Brazil-wide effects of trade liberalization were, states that 
were  more  exposed  to  tariff  cuts  (i.e.,  had  a  greater  share  of  workers  in  industries  with 
initially  high  tariffs)  experienced  smaller  reductions  in  household  poverty  and  inequality. 
Though  significance  of  results  for  states  as  a  whole  seemed  dependent  on  the  choice  of 
poverty and inequality indicators, this is not the case as soon as we disaggregate into rural and 
urban areas within states. Indeed significant and opposing effects emerge. Urban areas that 
were more affected by trade liberalization suffer lower poverty and inequality reductions (on 
average, a fall of one percentage point in our trade liberalization indicator in urban areas 
would lead to an increase in the headcount ratio of 0.67 percentage point and an increase in 
the Gini index of 0.26 percentage point). In the rural world, trade liberalization seems to have 
been  inequality  decreasing  (Gini  index  increasing  by  0.51  percentage  points)  and  no 
significant effect on poverty is observed. These results are non-negligible and confirmed by 
several robustness checks. Our findings on state poverty are in line with recent results for 
India (Topalova, 2005).27
When measures based on international trade flows are considered, our results show significant 
and  opposite  effects  for  import  penetration  and  export  exposure  ratios.  A  rise  in  export 
exposure of Brazilian states appears to have reduced poverty and inequality quite significantly 
while the growth of import penetration has increased both income distribution measures at the 
state level – this last result is in line with the one found for tariff reductions. These effects are 
still  observed  when  we  consider trade  flows  separately  in  the  industrial  and  agricultural 
sectors. As rising export ratios have a positive effect on welfare outcomes, the reduction in 
poverty  and  inequality  in  Brazil  might  be  reinforced  by  the  Brazilian  recent  trade 
performance.  Indeed,  Brazil  has  experienced  a  trade  surplus  since  2002  and  accelerated 
growth of exports in the last years.
Finally, and though beyond the scope of this paper, our differential effects across urban and 
rural areas in Brazil should encourage additional research on the various trade-transmission 
channels that operate for household income distribution, and that may be working differently 
depending on the geographical location. In fact, the role of trade-induced changes in labor 
income,  but  also  in  household  composition  and  occupational  situation  of  all  household 
members may differ across regions.
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Source: Author’s calculations from tariffs by sector. Data from Kume, H., Piani, G. and Souza, C.F. (2003) for 
the 1987-1994 period; since 1995 data made available by H. Kume.
Figure 2. Brazilian tariff levels in 1987 versus tariff levels and changes in 2005


































































































Source: Kume, H., Piani, G. and Souza, C.F. (2003) for the 1987-1994 period; since 1995 data made available 
by H. Kume.32
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on various sources (data from IBGE for production and data from 
SECEX for trade flows).33
Figure 4. Trade Openness, Import Penetration and Export Exposure Ratios in Brazilian
States, 1989 and 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on various sources (data from IBGE for production and data from SECEX 
for trade flows, maps done with Philcarto).34




























Gini Index, Brazil Gini Index (urban areas) Gini (rural areas)
Source: Authors’ calculations from PNAD.
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Source: Authors’ calculations from PNAD.35

















































































































































































































































Note: Inequality levels are measured by Gini index. Rural areas from states marked with a star (*) are excluded 
from the analysis, since PNAD survey only covered those regions since 2003.
Source: Authors’ calculations from PNAD.


















































































































































































































































Note: Poverty levels are measured by the headcount ratio. Rural areas from states marked with a star (*) are 
excluded from the analysis, since PNAD survey only covered those regions since 2003.
Source: Authors’ calculations from PNAD.36
Table 1a: Trade Liberalization and Poverty
Dependent variable




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Liberalization index:
LIB st -0,221 -0,665*** 0,243 -0,159* -0,234** 0,160
(0,161) (0,157) (0,321) (0,089) (0,097) (0,197)
% self-declared as "white" -0,040 -0,073 -0,053 -0,020 -0,030 -0,056
Education levels (%): (0,056) (0,050) (0,057) (0,040) (0,030) (0,052)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,400** -0,632*** -0,189 -0,577*** -0,529*** -0,455***
(0,165) (0,214) (0,138) (0,113) (0,136) (0,114)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling -0,309*** -0,689*** 0,163 -0,493*** -0,598*** -0,311***
(0,103) (0,122) (0,118) (0,070) (0,079) (0,090)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -1,118*** -0,978*** -1,932*** -0,754*** -0,540*** -1,378***
(0,254) (0,229) (0,348) (0,147) (0,132) (0,254)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,300 -0,314* 0,596 -0,243* -0,384*** 0,136
(0,212) (0,188) (0,408) (0,133) (0,117) (0,279)
with 15 or more years of schooling -1,655*** -1,412*** -0,326 -0,574* -0,457** 0,035
(0,493) (0,374) (0,693) (0,330) (0,229) (0,577)
Informal workers (%) 0,439*** 0,407*** 0,381*** 0,257*** 0,205*** 0,319***
(0,057) (0,047) (0,066) (0,035) (0,031) (0,056)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,444*** 0,410*** -0,109 0,246*** 0,217*** -0,040
(0,077) (0,093) (0,077) (0,045) (0,063) (0,053)
Number of observations 416 416 320 416 416 320
Adjusted R
2  0,789 0,733 0,676 0,760 0,651 0,651
Headcount ratio Poverty gap
Note :  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed effects and year dummies. 
Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%.
Table 1b: Trade Liberalization and Inequality
Dependent variable




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Liberalization index:
LIB st -0,133 -0,256*** 0,506** -0,483* -0,465* 1,834***
(0,086) (0,080) (0,213) (0,283) (0,282) (0,705)
% self-declared as "white" -0,008 -0,016 0,041 -0,061 -0,125 0,257
Education levels (%): (0,027) (0,024) (0,050) (0,108) (0,111) (0,167)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,037 -0,169 0,175 -0,266 -0,886** 0,529
(0,106) (0,124) (0,110) (0,351) (0,440) (0,357)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling 0,262*** 0,182** 0,177** 0,715*** 0,613* 0,130
(0,065) (0,084) (0,076) (0,260) (0,323) (0,256)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -0,611*** -0,412*** 0,174 -2,121*** -1,393*** 0,801
(0,127) (0,127) (0,244) (0,425) (0,450) (0,961)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,375*** 0,152 1,070*** 1,035** 0,495 2,701***
(0,119) (0,128) (0,280) (0,457) (0,510) (0,954)
with 15 or more years of schooling 1,587*** 1,313*** 2,813*** 3,484*** 2,671*** 7,559**
(0,232) (0,190) (1,026) (0,813) (0,641) (3,571)
Informal workers (%) 0,186*** 0,172*** 0,014 0,539*** 0,514*** 0,060
(0,035) (0,033) (0,049) (0,146) (0,132) (0,181)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,112** 0,047 -0,061 0,096 0,099 -0,212
(0,047) (0,068) (0,049) (0,161) (0,232) (0,164)
Number of observations 416 416 320 416 416 320
Adjusted R
2  0,578 0,483 0,399 0,435 0,309 0,254
Gini index Theil index
Note :  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed effects and year 
dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%. 37
Table 2a: Trade Openness and Poverty
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness s(t-1) 0,056 0,010
(0,050) (0,030)
Export exposure s(t-1) -0,119* -0,073*
(0,065) (0,041)
Import penetration s(t-1) 0,229** 0,089
(0,103) (0,061)
% self-declared as "white" -0,043 -0,027 -0,030 -0,022
Education levels (%): (0,072) (0,074) (0,047) (0,048)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,164 -0,126 -0,451*** -0,431***
(0,202) (0,201) (0,136) (0,136)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling -0,274** -0,350*** -0,495*** -0,532***
(0,124) (0,133) (0,083) (0,087)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -1,160*** -1,095*** -0,678*** -0,646***
(0,261) (0,259) (0,159) (0,157)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,128 0,030 -0,357** -0,403***
(0,224) (0,225) (0,151) (0,152)
with 15 or more years of schooling -1,281** -1,194** -0,146 -0,100
(0,529) (0,526) (0,348) (0,347)
Informal workers (%) 0,348*** 0,295*** 0,228*** 0,203***
(0,059) (0,059) (0,044) (0,044)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,360*** 0,386*** 0,174*** 0,185***
(0,092) (0,092) (0,059) (0,058)
Number of observations 338 338 338 338
Adjusted R
2  0,793 0,799 0,757 0,759
Note :  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed 
effects and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Headcount ratio Poverty gap
Table 2b: Trade Openness and Inequality
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade openness s(t-1) 0,004 0,000
(0,023) (0,085)
Export exposure s(t-1) -0,106*** -0,333**
(0,039) (0,146)
Import penetration s(t-1) 0,116** 0,338*
(0,050) (0,175)
% self-declared as "white" 0,034 0,044 0,128 0,160
Education levels (%): (0,034) (0,034) (0,113) (0,116)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,240** -0,212* -0,639 -0,553
(0,121) (0,115) (0,425) (0,408)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling 0,214*** 0,164** 0,622** 0,470
(0,076) (0,074) (0,298) (0,288)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -0,818*** -0,773*** -2,679*** -2,541***
(0,135) (0,130) (0,432) (0,408)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,190 0,124 0,558 0,359
(0,118) (0,116) (0,432) (0,429)
with 15 or more years of schooling 1,738*** 1,800*** 4,443*** 4,632***
(0,261) (0,266) (0,925) (0,951)
Informal workers (%) 0,124*** 0,089** 0,306* 0,199
(0,039) (0,039) (0,163) (0,171)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,106* 0,122** 0,123 0,172
(0,062) (0,059) (0,211) (0,201)
Number of observations 338 338 338 338
Adjusted R
2  0,541 0,555 0,374 0,386
Note :  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed 
effects and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Gini index Theil index38




Poverty gap Gini index Theil index
Industry
Export exposure Ind. s(t-1) -0,059** -0,037** -0,048*** -0,143**
(0,024) (0,016) (0,019) (0,068)
Import penetration Ind. s(t-1) 0,056** 0,026* 0,031** 0,067
Agriculture (0,023) (0,015) (0,015) (0,049)
Export exposure Agri. s(t-1) -0,034** -0,023** -0,026*** -0,062***
(0,015) (0,011) (0,008) (0,022)
Import penetration Agri. s(t-1) 0,063* 0,010 0,033* 0,118**
(0,037) (0,025) (0,019) (0,060)
% self-declared as "white" -0,045 -0,034 0,023 0,105
Education levels (%): (0,076) (0,049) (0,035) (0,120)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,173 -0,448*** -0,220* -0,607
(0,212) (0,143) (0,120) (0,435)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling -0,328** -0,533*** 0,157** 0,450
(0,134) (0,085) (0,074) (0,297)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -1,110*** -0,661*** -0,754*** -2,468***
(0,273) (0,161) (0,139) (0,433)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,123 -0,308* 0,196 0,453
(0,242) (0,162) (0,136) (0,497)
with 15 or more years of schooling -1,168** -0,146 1,804*** 4,808***
(0,556) (0,345) (0,262) (0,967)
Informal workers (%) 0,327*** 0,221*** 0,106*** 0,263
(0,061) (0,046) (0,040) (0,168)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,336*** 0,162*** 0,091 0,072
(0,088) (0,056) (0,060) (0,209)
Number of observations 299 299 299 299
Adjusted R
2  0,802 0,762 0,577 0,399
Note :  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed 
effects and year dummies. 3 states are excluded : Acre, Rio grande do Norte and Roraima Regressions are 
weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; 
* significant at 10%.
Poverty Inequality
Table 4: Quintiles – Summary results
Dependent variable Quintile1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
(i)   Overall  - LIB st 0,053 0,133 0,192 0,240 -0,536
(0,060) (0,095) (0,137) (0,183) (0,412)
(ii)   Urban areas - LIB st 0,227*** 0,336*** 0,310** 0,230 -1,293***
(0,070) (0,109) (0,131) (0,174) (0,416)
(iii)   Rural areas- LIB st -0,482** -0,523** -0,435 -0,427 2,016**
(0,215) (0,261) (0,272) (0,299) (0,939)
(iv)   Trade openness s(t-1) -0,006 0,014 -0,020 -0,057 -0,018
(0,021) (0,028) (0,038) (0,050) (0,123)
Export exposure s(t-1) 0,081*** 0,121*** 0,110* 0,117 -0,458**
(v) (0,031) (0,044) (0,059) (0,083) (0,193)
Import penetration s(t-1) -0,099** -0,095 -0,148* -0,235** 0,425*
(0,044) (0,060) (0,078) (0,103) (0,241)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state 
fixed effects and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of 
people in a state. *** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10%.39
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SECEX.
Table A1: Industry concordance
Trade Industry (Kume et al)  PNAD Code  PNAD Industry  Final Code Final Industry
Agricultural products  11-42  Various crops, horticulture and forestry 1 Agricultural products
Mining products  50, 53-59  Prospecting and extraction of non-oil/gas/coal minerals 2 Mining products
Oil and coal extraction  51-52  Oil, gas and coal 3 Oil and coal extraction
Non-metallic minerals  100  Non-metal processing 4 Non-metallic minerals
Steel products  110  Steel products 5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Non-ferrous metallurgy  110  Non-steel metals products 5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Other metallurgical products 110  5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Machinery and tractors  120  Manufacture of machines and equipment  6 Machinery and tractors
Electrical equipment 130  Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment  7 Electrical and electronic equipment
Electronic equipment 130  Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment 7 Electrical and electronic equipment
Automobiles, trucks and buses 140  Manufacture of vehicles and parts 8 Automobiles, trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles
Parts, components and other vehicles  140  Manufacture of vehicles and parts 8 Automobiles, trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles
Wood products and furniture  150, 151, 160  Manufacture of wood products and furniture 9 Wood products and furniture
Cellulose, paper and printing  170, 290  Pulp and paper products, printing and newspapers  10 Cellulose, paper and printing
Rubber products 180  Rubber products 11 Rubber products
Chemical elements  200  Chemical products  12 Chemical elements and products
Oil refining  201  Oil and petroleum products 13 Oil refining and petrochemicals
Chemical products  200  Chemical products  12 Chemical elements and products
Pharmaceutical and perfumery products  210, 220  Pharmaceuticals and toiletries 14 Pharmaceutical and perfumery products
Plastic products  230  Plastics 16 Plastic products
Textile products  240, 241 Textiles  17 Textile products
Apparel 250  Apparel and clothing 18 Apparel
Footwear  251  Footwear 19 Footwear
Coffee industry  21  Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Processing of vegetal products  280  Tobacco and other vegetal processing 20 Processing of vegetal products
Meat packing 260  Food preparation 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Dairy industry 260  Food preparation 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Sugar 17?  Sugar cane extraction?  21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Vegetal products  260 21  Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products 21
Other food products  260, 261, 271  Other foods and drinks 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Other industries 300  Various scientific instruments  99 Unclassified manufacturing
340-903  Construction, services, retail, finance, government etc. 22 Nontradables
Omitted  190  Leather and skins
202  Manufacture of synthetic materials (nylon etc)
Source: Ferreira et alii (2007a)40
Table A2. Trade Liberalization and Poverty with alternative indicators 
Dependent variable
LIB st  LIB2 st LIB st - IV LIB st  LIB2 st LIB st - IV
Trade Liberalization index -0,221 -0,415*** -1,689*** -0,159* -0,231*** -0,940***
(0,161) (0,096) (0,410) (0,089) (0,055) (0,248)
% self-declared as "white" -0,040 -0,075 -0,002 -0,020 -0,040 0,001
(0,056) (0,055) (0,076) (0,040) (0,040) (0,049)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,400** -0,346** -0,404 -0,577*** -0,547*** -0,579***
(0,165) (0,151) (0,265) (0,113) (0,106) (0,162)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling -0,309*** -0,143 -0,347** -0,493*** -0,400*** -0,513***
(0,103) (0,098) (0,142) (0,070) (0,071) (0,088)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -1,118*** -1,200*** -1,684*** -0,754*** -0,785*** -1,054***
(0,254) (0,223) (0,348) (0,147) (0,133) (0,201)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,300 0,310 -0,100 -0,243* -0,227* -0,455***
(0,212) (0,203) (0,281) (0,133) (0,122) (0,162)
with 15 or more years of schooling -1,655*** -1,766*** -2,013*** -0,574* -0,627** -0,765**
(0,493) (0,461) (0,603) (0,330) (0,315) (0,383)
Informal workers (%) 0,439*** 0,453*** 0,360*** 0,257*** 0,267*** 0,215***
(0,057) (0,057) (0,094) (0,035) (0,036) (0,055)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,444*** 0,282*** 0,375*** 0,246*** 0,157*** 0,209***
(0,077) (0,070) (0,088) (0,045) (0,047) (0,053)
Number of observations 416 416 416 416 416 416
Adjusted R
2  0,789 0,811 0,684 0,760 0,775 0,687
Note :  The units of analysis are the Brazilian states. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions 
include state fixed effects and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. *** 
significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10%.
Headcount ratio Poverty gap
Table A3. Trade Liberalization and Inequality with alternative indicators 
Dependent variable
LIB st  LIB2 st LIB st - IV LIB st  LIB2 st LIB st - IV
Trade Liberalization index -0,133 -0,110* -0,447** -0,483* -0,216 -0,878
(0,086) (0,056) (0,222) (0,283) (0,235) (0,937)
% self-declared as "white" -0,008 -0,019 0,000 -0,061 -0,089 -0,051
(0,027) (0,027) (0,030) (0,108) (0,104) (0,120)
with 1 to 3 years of schooling -0,037 -0,023 -0,038 -0,266 -0,236 -0,267
(0,106) (0,107) (0,112) (0,351) (0,355) (0,353)
with 4 to 7 years of schooling 0,262*** 0,308*** 0,254*** 0,715*** 0,811*** 0,705***
(0,065) (0,066) (0,068) (0,260) (0,249) (0,267)
with 8 to 10 years of schooling -0,611*** -0,604*** -0,732*** -2,121*** -2,022*** -2,273***
(0,127) (0,125) (0,161) (0,425) (0,426) (0,569)
with 11 to 14 years of schooling 0,375*** 0,397*** 0,289** 1,035** 1,141** 0,928
(0,119) (0,120) (0,145) (0,457) (0,454) (0,589)
with 15 or more years of schooling 1,587*** 1,576*** 1,510*** 3,484*** 3,516*** 3,388***
(0,232) (0,226) (0,260) (0,813) (0,803) (0,843)
Informal workers (%) 0,186*** 0,194*** 0,169*** 0,539*** 0,567*** 0,518***
(0,035) (0,035) (0,039) (0,146) (0,143) (0,160)
Size of agricultural sector (%) 0,112** 0,073 0,097* 0,096 0,029 0,077
(0,047) (0,052) (0,050) (0,161) (0,185) (0,168)
Number of observations 416 416 416 416 416 416
Adjusted R
2  0,578 0,583 0,551 0,435 0,432 0,430
Note :  The units of analysis are the Brazilian states. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions include state fixed 
effects and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a state. *** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * 
significant at 10%.
Gini index Theil index